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We analyze underreported earnings and age-specific income redistribution in post-
socialist economies. Pensions, other transfers and public expenditures are financed 
from contributions and wage taxes, respectively. We derive the reported earnings 
and savings from individual utility maximization, when workers overly discount the 
future, obtain partial satisfaction from reporting earnings, cannot be excluded from 
the use of public services. The government maximizes a utilitarian social welfare 
function, corrected for discounting and taking into account the utility of public 
services. An optimal proportional pension system – complemented by appropriate 
means-testing – provides higher welfare than any system containing a significant flat 
component. 
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A keresetbevallást és a korspecifikus jövedelem-újraelosztást elemezzük a 
posztszocialista gazdaságokban. A nyugdíjakat, más transzfereket és a közkiadásokat 
járulékokból és adókból fedezik. Egyéni hasznosságmaximalizálásból származtatjuk a 
keresetbevallást és a megtakarítást, amelynek során a dolgozók túlzottan leszámítolják 
a jövőt, és részleges kielégülést nyernek a keresetbevallásból, valamint nem lehet őket 
kizárni a közszolgáltatások igénybevételéből. A kormány olyan utilitarista társadalmi 
jóléti függvényt maximalizál, amely eltekint a leszámítolástól, és figyelembe veszi a 
közszolgálatok hasznát. Egy megfelelő rászorultsági nyugdíjjal kiegészített optimális 
keresetarányos nyugdíj nagyobb jólétet nyújt, mint bármely olyan rendszer, amelyben 
jelentős mértékű alapnyugdíjat kap minden nyugdíjas. 
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i1. Introduction
In the classical socialist (centrally planned) economies, the heavy pro¯ts and modest
contributions of the government-owned ¯rms ¯nanced the welfare systems. In the tran-
sition economies (like any market economy), however, the welfare systems are ¯nanced
from taxes and contributions. While the privatization of the whole economy made the
economic system more e±cient and compatible with democracy, it also opened up wide
possibilities for employees and employers to avoid taxes and contributions, making the
¯nancing of the public sector, including the welfare system di±cult. As a result of the
structural pension reforms, started after 1998 in a number of post-socialist countries, the
progressivity of the new pensions have been slowly or quickly phased out. These trends
have strengthened the incentives to report earnings more fully but have reduced and
will reduce the newly rewarded public pensions of those who reported and will report
low lifetime earnings (with short reported lengths of employment or low reported earn-
ings), regardless whether the report was correct or not. The voluntary old-age savings
help myopic workers little, moreover, only the better paid evaders save at all. Similar
problems arise in Latin American countries and on a smaller scale, in the developed
world.
We speak of a progressive pension system if the ratio of bene¯t to earning is a
decreasing function of the earning. Usually but not always the bene¯t increases with
the earning. Representing a progressive system as a linear combination of a universal
°at bene¯t plus a proportional bene¯t can be a good approximation (Disney, 2004).
Some countries (e.g. the Czech Republic) ¯nance proportional and °at pensions from
contributions proportional to reported earnings, while other countries (e.g. Denmark)
¯nance the °at pension from general taxes.
A lively debate has recently started in Hungary whether the phasing-out of the
redistributive elements in the pension system since 1998 was an error which needs a quick
correction or not. According to the critics, any future pension should be explicitly a sum
of °at (or basic, or Beveridgian) and proportional (or contributional or Bismarckian)
components. Other experts (including me) contend this view, defend the proportional
system and propose a much more modest and cheaper remedy, namely means-testing, i.e.
topping up only the low pensions, and the government may even restrict this addition to
those with genuine low earnings, monitoring savings or assets. There is only a consensus
in the following: the development of the pension system should be calculable and the
subsequent governments should follow credible pension strategies.
In an earlier paper (Simonovits, 2008), I studied the interrelation between reported
earnings and redistribution in the pension system with the help of an elementary model.
There it was assumed that the workers report either their full earnings or the statutory
1minimum wage, for short, minimum wage. Both the universal °at pension and the
means-tested pension are ¯nanced from value added taxes, whose payment cannot be
avoided. Assuming that among people reporting minimum earnings, the evaders and
the low paid can be told apart, it has been shown that the means-tested system is more
attractive than the universal °at system.
The present paper \complicates" the elementary model by endogenizing reporting
wages and savings. Following the methodology of neoclassical economics, it derives the
reported earnings and savings from individual utility maximization, overly discounting
the future, partially enjoying to report earnings, while free-riding on public goods and
services. A worker only reports his earnings to increase his resulting earnings-related
bene¯t and moral satisfaction or decrease his transaction costs. A sensible model of
the interaction between underreporting wages and income redistribution cannot neglect
the existence of wage taxes either, because anyone who avoids paying contribution also
avoids paying wage tax. A progressive wage tax, in turn, may redistribute between the
working poor and the working rich, while a progressive pension system can do the same
among the pensioners. We must also consider public goods ¯nanced from taxes, to be
used freely by everybody (or alternatively, assume a balanced tax system, where public
goods are paid from individual incomes).
The government has a social welfare function, built up from paternalistic, objective
utility functions (without excessive discounting and with due respect to public goods
and services) and the parameter values of the tax- and pension system are obtained
from social welfare maximization. The major result of the present paper is as follows:
if the workers have common reporting preferences, then there is a critical preference
value, for which an optimal proportional pension system and an optimal progressive
pension system (containing a °at pension component) achieve the same social welfare.
(We shall see that if positive savings occur, then the social optimum is indeterminate.)
Below that preference value (in a dark grey economy), the proportional system achieves
higher welfare than the progressive system, above that preference value (in a light
grey economy), the reverse holds. In the limiting case, when the workers report their
full earnings (white economy), and the labor supply is still exogeneously given, it is
worthwhile to introduce fully redistributive earning tax and pure °at pension.
We also add another idealization: there is only a wage tax but no value added
tax. We investigate the impact of the structure of the tax- and pension system on the
reported earnings and the savings of individuals with di®erent earnings and reporting
preferences in a general equilibrium framework.
As a technical simpli¯cation, we assume that the population and the economy, in-
cluding the pension system, are stationary, moreover, there is full employment. We
also assume that the workers fully understand the mechanism of the system and the
government determines its tax- and pension strategy as a benevolent dictator.
In reality, population aging increases the burden on the pension systems. Full em-
ployment is only present in few countries during exceptionally good periods, furthermore
in the short run, population aging may mitigate unemployment. Labor supply is also
sensitive to the tax wedge (Diamond, 2003). Obviously, a large part of the workers
does not understand the basic rules of the pension system. Note also that governments
frequently concentrate on short-term political interests rather than on long-term so-
cial welfare. The resulting unpredictable government behavior undermines the workers'
2trust in the system.
The stability of the tax- and pension system is also an important factor of satisfactory
reporting of earnings. This stability, however, varies from country to country. For
example, in the US, the public pension system is basically stable, while in the otherwise
similar Great Britain, the pension system's basic structure has often been changed in
recent decades. Mentioning a closer example: the Czech pension system has hardly been
changing, while the erstwhile twin, Slovakia radically transformed its pension system
in 2004, from a °at system to a proportional system. The U-turns of the Hungarian
pension policy would require a separate study (G¶ al et al., eds. 2008).
Having outlined the general model, we analyze the issue with a simple example,
where the utility functions are logarithmic (though one function also contains a linear
term). To be able to derive analytical expressions, further simpli¯cations are needed.
Even then we were only able to derive the conditional individual decisions, without
solving the general equilibrium problem in a closed form. The only exception is the
case of the proportional tax- and pension system or the case of the white economy.
In the latter case, where every worker reports his full wage, even the socially optimal
tax and contribution rates can be analytically determined. Interesting results can also
be obtained for the black economy, where the workers only report the minimum wage,
regardless of their true wages.
When we turn on the computer, and ¯ll the model with illustrative numbers, we are
able to take into account the balance conditions, too. The most important results are
contained in Table 6: in the dark grey economy, the progressive system is inferior to the
proportional system, while in the light grey economy, the reverse holds. We hope that
even in the latter case, the completion of the proportional system with means-testing
or pension credit is superior to the progressive one.
The technical problems of modeling required utmost simpli¯cations. We hope that
notwithstanding its abstractness, our toy model contributes to the better understanding
of the interaction among reporting of earnings, saving, taxation and the public pension
system. Anyway, we must consider the conclusions with utmost care.
Having presented the model, now we outline the related literature. The issue of
universal versus means-tested pension was already discussed by Friedman and Cohen
(1972): they suggested the replacement of the former by the latter, thus reducing the
size of the welfare program. Akerlof (1978) investigated the issue in a more general
framework and rejected the idea of a negative wage tax (similar to a °at pension)
on the ground that it puts a too heavy marginal burden on the shoulders of a typical
taxpayer. Modeling the choice between °at and means-tested pensions, Feldstein (1987)
introduced individual utility functions and a utilitarian social welfare function built
from paternalistic utility functions, without discounting (see also Docquier, 2002). He
only considered homogeneous wage rates, ¯xed labor supply and °at bene¯ts. Though
he proved that the means-tested system is generally superior to a progressive one, he
found the opposite atypically when (i) the former \may induce some utility-maximizing
workers to save nothing" or (ii) to avoid problem (i), the means-tested bene¯t is set
lower than socially optimal. In a more modern approach, the time-inconsistent behavior
of excessive discounting was modeled by the hyperbolic discounting in Diamond and
K} oszegi (2003).
The recent history of the British pension system provides ample evidence on these
3issues. Indeed, our questions have already been discussed in the context of the ongo-
ing British reforms: the universal °at bene¯t has been topped-up since 1997 (means-
testing), which in turn was relaxed by the introduction of a pension credit in 2003 (Clark
and Emmerson, 2003). In a very sophisticated model, Sefton at al. (2008) demonstrated
that the introduction of the pension credit raises the savings of the lower-paid but re-
duces the others, only modestly improving the overall situation. Similar issues have
surfaced in the reform of Chile's means-tested pension system (Barr and Diamond,
(2008), Chapter 13.2). Note that a Special Pension Study (2006) discussed the issue of
minimum wage provision and the adequacy of pensioners' consumption.
Following this line of thought, Fehr et al. (2008a) created a computable general
equilibrium model with individual risk of career paths and life span and determined
numerically the key parameters of the socially optimal German \progressive pension
arrangement". Their results are shocking: the quite generous but strongly earning-
related pension system should be replaced by a progressive system, plus uniformly
relieving the earnings from pension contribution up to 30% of the average earnings.
They acknowledge the hike in the marginal pension contribution rate, the resulting
reduction in the originally higher pensions, the generated heavy loss of labor supply
but appreciate the simultaneous increase in social insurance so high that accept it. In a
companion paper (Fehr et al. 2008b), they evaluate the German public pension system
\with rational and hyperbolic consumers" and show the advantage of the system over
the private one in ensuring life annuity, especially for workers with weak will-power.
Barr and Diamond (2008, Chapter 7) also strongly emphasize the insurance (neglected
here) provided by the progressive pension system when the future earnings are uncertain
at the start. For an early model, see Varian (1980).
In her pioneering study, Augusztinovics (2005) showed that|due to fractured labor
careers|a large part of the Hungarian cohorts retiring in the next decades would have
quite low pensions. (For a newer treatment, see Augusztinovics and KÄ oll} o, 2008.) To
avoid mass old-age poverty, she proposed a signi¯cant reduction of the present propor-
tional bene¯ts and the corresponding contribution rate, while introducing a universal
°at bene¯t, to be ¯nanced from new value added taxes. An additional advantage of
such a system is that however small contribution during however short period worth be
paid, because the accruing pension is added to the °at bene¯t. Nevertheless, such a
system weakens the incentives to report wages above a quite low threshold.
Vald¶ es-Prieto (2009) analyzed a model, where workers choose the density of contri-
bution, i.e. \the proportion of active life worked in fully covered jobs (density) rather
than hours worked." Instead of diminishing the worker's utility as underreporting does
in our model, he explicitly models the reduction of productivity in the informal sector
and compares the e±ciency of various insurance systems, including pension credit.
In most models, it is the labor supply rather than the reported earning, that plays
the main role. Cremer et al. (2007) and Koethenbuerger et al. (2008) considered the
following question: what type and what size of a pension system do voters vote for? (In
addition to pension contributions, the second paper also considered wage taxes which
¯nance public goods and services.) The political economy approach supplements our
welfare approach and yields a similar result: the more redistributive a tax- and pension
system, the smaller is its size. Cremer et al. (2008) are even closer to the present model,
emphasizing the distinction between subjective and objective utility functions and the
4role of the credit constraint in the forced saving.
Since the present paper also models the tax system even if in a rudimentary form,
we mention a few models on reporting wages for taxation purposes. For the case of
°exible labor supply, the unique socially optimal linear tax rate can easily be determined
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980). The classical paper of tax evasion is Allingham and
Sandmo (1972), which determined the optimal reported wage under given wage, tax
rate, audit probability and ¯ne. Pestieau and Possen (1991) modeled the connection
between tax evasion behavior and the choice of work place, anticipating a most serious
problem of any transition economy. Feldstein (1999) and Chetty (2009) analyzed tax
avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax, including underreported incomes
into the generalized labor supply. In their survey, Andreoni et al. (1998) extended
the narrow neoclassical model and introduced soft but relevant concepts like moral
sentiments and the satisfaction of the taxpayer with public goods and services. From
our point of view, they made three important claims: (i) the morally more sensitive
citizens declare a higher share of their true wages; (ii) the more unfair the tax system is
in the eyes of the citizens, the less wage they declare; (iii) the less satis¯ed the taxpayers
are with the public goods and services, the less wage they declare. In a related study,
Lack¶ o (2007) demonstrated that the preference to report is closely related to the citizens'
opinion of the utility of public goods and services.
Mc Gillivrey (2001) and Christie and Holzner (2006) extended the ¯eld from tax
evasion to contributions evasion. In their empirical work, the latter considered both old
and new EU members and obtained interesting estimates on the degree of dual evasion.
For example, according to their Table 1.19, in Hungary, 2002, individuals reported 69.8
percent of their personal income tax base, while only 63.6 percent of their gross earnings
base. In contrast, their Table 1.10 contains a pair 76.6 and 67.5 percents on the Czech
Republic, 2003. Similarly, Janky (2007) considered the public attitudes toward tax (and
contribution) evasion in Hungary and he cited remarkable data from CEORG Omnibus
survey 1999 (Table 2). To the question \Is it improper for a tax-payer to provide a
false income statement in order to avoid taxes?", 53% of the Hungarians and 77% of the
Czechs answered with disapproval, while 42% of the Hungarians and 18% of the Czechs
found it excusable. While I doubt if such a sharp di®erence exists in real life, it is
consistent with the prevalence of contributive pensions in Hungary and of redistributive
pensions in the Czech Republic. Nevertheless, the redistributive pension system pushes
the self-employed in the direction of underreporting in both countries. Bakos et al.
(2008) discussed the tax evasion behavior of the Hungarian employees.
OECD (2002) gave a wide survey on the `non-observed' economy. For a comparative
analysis of the hidden economies of transitional countries, see also Lack¶ o (2000). Tonin
(2007) and Elek et al. (2009) analyzed the related interaction of minimum wage and
tax evasion. Studying the e®ects of Russian °at tax reform of 2001, Gorodnichenko et
al. (2009, p. 505), concluded that \(i) the tax evasion response to the tax change was
large, but that (ii) the productivity response was relatively week ...." This justi¯es our
concentration on underreported earnings rather than restrained labor supply.
We outline the structure of the present paper. Section 2 develops the model and then
Section 3 presents some analytical results. Sections 4 displays numerical illustrations
and Section 5 concludes.
52. The model
This Section starts with the determination of that pair of earnings report and saving
which maximize the lifetime utility function of a given worker. Then we outline the
macro framework and the social welfare function to be maximized by the government.
The utility maximizing worker
We shall make the following extreme, nevertheless meaningful assumptions. The popu-
lation and the economy are stationary. Every young person works and every old person
is retired. The worker is employed for a unit time period and the pensioner enjoys
his retirement for a period of length ¹, 0 < ¹ < 1. (In practice, the more one earns,
the longer he lives on average but here we neglect this relation.) Most existing sys-
tems super°uously di®erentiate between employer's and employee's contributions, but
we assume a uni¯ed contribution. Contrary to practice, we work with the total wage
cost w rather than gross wages (their di®erence is the employer's contribution) and we
calculate on its basis. Every worker ¯les in a report v on his earnings w, v 2 [wm;w]
and pays a positive pension contribution ¿v > 0, where wm > 0 denotes the minimum
wage. The pension system is in balance. In addition, the worker pays a linear wage
tax µv with a tax rate µ > 0 and receives a lump-sum return " > 0. The net tax is
µv ¡ ". (This is the simplest formulation of progressive wage taxation.) The net tax
¯nances public goods and services including health care. (It will be clear that without
considering taxes, the model is not only unrealistic but mathematically con¯ned to an
unnecessarily narrow domain in the model space.)
In the present model, every worker has two characteristics, namely his wage w and his
preference to report on his earning w, p. Assume that the two characteristics have a joint
discrete probability distribution with relative frequencies fi, perhaps index i = (j;k) has
two dimensions. We assume that a worker with (w;p) reports an earning v 2 [wm;w]
and saves s ¸ 0. Due to a saving technology, the pensioner will have s=¹ to dissave
per period. Note that this means that the e±ciency of the private saving is equal to
that of the pension system. This is an assumption frequently used (e.g. Cremer et al.,
2008). Others (like Feldstein, 1987) insist on the superiority of private savings over
public savings, consequently they introduce an interest factor ½, which is higher than
1=¹. Taking into account the high cost of providing indexed life annuities, one can also
argue for ½ < 1=¹.
The life annuity b consists of two parts: a universal °at bene¯t ® ¸ 0 and a labor
pension proportional to earnings report, ¯v, where ¯ ¸ 0 is the marginal accrual rate,
therefore b = ® + ¯v.
The intensities of the worker's and the pensioner's consumption are respectively
c = w ¡ (¿ + µ)v + " ¡ s and d = ® + ¯v + ¹¡1s:
(Note that both consumptions are to be positive and the total consumption of a pen-
sioner is ¹d.) Let us introduce the total burden rate t = ¿ +µ, its complement is called
the tax wedge: 1 ¡ t > 0. Hence c = w ¡ tv + " ¡ s. In our linear wage tax system,





; ¹ a =
µ¹ v ¡ "
1 + ¹
:
6If one consider the involvement of public goods to the model, (s)he can get rid of it by
adding a balance condition, namely ¹ a = 0 or equivalently, " = µ¹ v.
The subjective lifetime utility function of every worker consists of four parts: (i) the
worker's utility u(c), (ii) the pensioner's utility ±¹u(d), where 0 < ± < 1 is the excessive
discount factor, (iii) the utility of the public good q(¹ a) ¯nanced by the average tax ¹ a
and (iv) the utility of reporting wage v when one earns w: z(w;p;v). (This corresponds
to the moral sentiments in Andreoni et al. (1998) plus the utility loss due to the cost
of underreporting in Feldstein (1999).) In sum,
^ Z(w;p;c;d;v) = u(c) + ±¹u(d) + (1 + ¹)q(¹ a) + z(w;p;v): (1)
(The hat distinguishes this function from the one to be used below.) As is usual, u(¢)
and z(w;p;¢) are smooth, strictly increasing and strictly concave functions.
By de¯nition, the worker determines his reported wage v(w;p) and saving s(w;p) so
as to maximize the subjective utility ^ Z(w;p;c;d;v). By substituting the consumption
equations into ^ Z(w;p;c;d;v) and dropping hat and the individually uncontrollable q(¢),
yields
Z(w;p;v;s) = u(w ¡ tv + " ¡ s) + ±¹u(® + ¯v + ¹¡1s) + z(w;p;v);
and partial derivation by v and s yields the optimum. Except for the black economy,
where v = wm, we shall always assume that the reported earning is greater than the
minimum wage: v > wm.
Slack credit constraint (S)
First assume that the worker's saving is also an internal optimum: slack credit con-
straint. Note that each type consists of many similar and independent workers, there-
fore the impact of a single individual on the average tax is practically nil. At this point
we call the reader's attention to the fact that we shall use corresponding letters S and
B to di®erentiate between slack and binding credit constraints. Then the ¯rst-order
necessary conditions are
Z0
v(w;p;v;s) = ¡tu0(c) + ±¹¯u0(d) + z0
v(w;p;v) = 0 (2S)
and
Z0
s(w;p;v;s) = ¡u0(c) + ±u0(d) = 0: (3S)
Under suitable regularity assumptions, this system of equations can be solved as
follows: we express d from (3S) as a function of c: d = d(c). Then we substitute it into
(2S):
z0
v(w;p;v) = (t ¡ ¯¹)u0(c); (4S)
whence v can be similarly expressed: v = v(c). (If we neglected the tax system and the
°at bene¯t, then the RHS of (4S) would disappear, and the reported earnings would
become independent of the pension system. Moreover, every worker would fully report
his earnings!)
7To have c as a function of individual characteristics, we must eliminate s. By mul-
tiplying equation for d by ¹ and adding to equation for c, s cancels out and we arrive
to the lifetime individual budget constraint:
c + ¹d(c) = ¹® + w ¡ (t ¡ ¯¹)v(c) + ": (5S)
From this equation, we can determine c¤ = cS(w;p), then d¤ = dS(w;p), v¤ = vS(w;p)
and ¯nally, s¤ = sS(w;p).
Binding credit constraint (B)
What happens if the above optimal saving is negative? Then it only remains a plan and
the credit constraint becomes binding: s = 0. (If we accepted negative savings, then
we should model that the worker should pay much higher interest after his credit than
what he receives after his savings, i.e. the interest on loan should be positive.) Then
(3S) is replaced by
Z0
s(w;p;v;0) = ¡u0(c) + ±u0(d) < 0 for s = 0: (3B)
Consequently, the other optimum condition, namely for vB, becomes
Z0
v(w;p;v;0) = ¡tu0(w ¡ tv + ") + ±¹¯u0(® + ¯v) + z0
v(w;p;v) = 0; (2B)
yielding directly v = vB(w;p). Finally, (3S) and (5S) are replaced by
cB(w;p) = w ¡ tvB(w;p) + " and dB(w;p) = ® + ¯vB(w;p): (5B)
The positivity of c and d are guaranteed by the usual assumptions. One must also pay
attention to the feasibility of the reported earnings but with suitable parameter values,
wm · vB · w holds.
Macro framework
Until now we have only considered a single, though arbitrary worker. In reality, there
exists a lot of types, type i characterized by wage wi and preference to report pi,
i = 1;2;:::;I > 1. They could also di®er by their discount factors and expected lengths
in retirement, but we gloss over the latter complexities. (Note, however, that in Feldstein
(1987) or Cremer et al. (2007), the heterogeneity of the discount factor played a crucial
role.)





where the optimal vi is either vS
i or vB
i and ¹ v depends on (®;";µ;¿;¯). Note that we
have suppressed the dependence of reported earnings on the preferences to report.
8We also assume that the pension system is balanced, therefore for any given feasible
nonnegative parameter vector (¯;";µ;¿), we are looking for a ¯fth parameter ® ¸ 0, so
that using (6),
¿¹ v = ¹(® + ¯¹ v): (7)
If ¿ ¸ ¹¯, then ® > 0 exists.
Finally, we outline the government's welfare maximizing task. As a starting point,
we de¯ne a paternalistic objective utility function for type (wi;pi) as
U(ci;di;¹ a;vi) = u(c(wi;pi)) + ¹u(d(wi;pi)) + (1 + ¹)q(¹ a) + z(wi;pi;vi); (8)
where the myopic discounting disappears.
The social welfare function is de¯ned as the average of the objective utilities taken








The government looks for a vector (®;";µ;¿;¯) such that|in addition to satisfying (7)
with de¯nition (6)|maximizes the social welfare function (9).
Means-tested bene¯t (M)
Finally, we must also discuss the means-tested pension system, its symbol is M. The
starting point is simple: the lower the share of the °at bene¯t in the total bene¯t,
the greater is the danger that the lower paid's bene¯t is too low. This problem can
be tackled if the average pension is raised. In fact, the lower is the share of the °at
component, the larger is the size of the pension system (cf. Koethenbuerger et al.,
2008). But in a system su®ering just from underreporting of earnings, there are strong
hurdles to this solution, and it may be more appropriate to introduce means-testing.
This is, however, a two-edged weapon. On the one hand, it reduces the burden; on the
other hand, it eliminates the connection between the contribution and the bene¯ts of
the low-paid, undermining their incentives to report earnings.
Let ° be the value of the means-tested bene¯t. Then the proportional bene¯t rule
b = ¯v is replaced by
b(M) = max[¯v;°]:
Of course, the government must choose such a value for °, which saves the low-paid
from poverty. It should be at least as great as the °at bene¯t: ° ¸ ®, but it should not
be too attractive. For example, ° = ® is a good compromise. Or, if this is awkward,
then the free-riders should be excluded on a selection process based on external signals
(Simonovits, 2008).
It is quite di±cult to derive the optimum conditions of such a system, because in
addition to the S{B distinction, we should also make a di®erence whether the type (w;p)
receives a normal or a means-tested bene¯t. In the latter case, in the equation for the
optimal report, ¯ = 0, and in the equation of means testing, ° ¡ ¯v > 0 is ¯nanced by
others. (7) modi¯es as follows:
¿¹ v = ¹(® + ¯¹ v) + ¹
I X
i=1
fi[° ¡ ¯vi]+; (7M)
9where x+ is the positive part of a real number x: x+ = x if x ¸ 0, x+ = 0 if x < 0. In
reality, proportional systems with ® = 0 are frequently complemented by means-testing.
3. Analytical results
In this Section we consider simple cases rather than a general framework which can be
studied analytically.
Logarithmic utility functions
Most studies (cf. Feldstein, 1987) apply logarithmic speci¯cation, although it eliminates
certain subtler relations. In order to exclude the anomaly that the worker can increase
his subjective utility by overreporting his true earning, a linear term had to be added
to the logarithmic function z(w;p;¢). Here are the parametric functions:
u(c) = logc; z(w;p;v) = p(logv ¡ v=w); q(¹ a) = ·log¹ a;
where p > 0 is the parameter of the preference to report and · > 0 is the parameter of the
e±ciency of public goods and services. Note that u0(c) = 1=c, z0
v(w;p;v) = p(1=v¡1=w),
q0(¹ a) = ·=¹ a. They are all positive and decreasing in the interval wm < v · w.
We again distinguish the cases of slack and binding credit constraints but temporarily
neglect the macrobalance (7).
Slack credit constraint
We start our analysis with the case of slack credit constraint. Introducing notion t1 =
t ¡ ¹¯, (3S) and (4S) imply
d(c) = ±c and v(c) =
pwc
pc + t1w
; t > ¹¯: (10S)
Inserting (10S) into (5S),
c + ±¹c +
t1pwc
pc + t1w
= w + ¹® + ": (12S)
(Note that if p ! +1, then v ! w.)
After rearrangement, we obtain a quadratic equation for c:
h2c2 + h1c + h0 = 0;
where
h2 = p(1 + ¹±); h1 = t1(1 + ¹±)w + t1pw ¡ p(w + ¹® + "); h0 = ¡t1w(w + ¹® + "):
The equation has a unique positive root and under suitable speci¯cation, it is less than
or equal to the earning: vS · w.
Hence the other variables can also be expressed with the parameters of the model.
Note that sS = w ¡ tvS ¡ cS ¡ " should be nonnegative. In case of negative value, we
must put zero, as is done in the next subsection.
10Binding credit constraint
We turn to the analysis of the binding credit constraint. In view of (2B), the equation















This equation is cubic in v, which can be solved in a closed form, but its treatment
is prohibitively di±cult. There are two special cases, when the equation reduces to a
quadratic one: (i) the purely proportional system and (ii) the purely °at pension: either
¡
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= 0 if ¯ = 0: (13B2)
Fixing the other parameter values, it is obvious that the report is higher in the propor-
tional than in the °at system.
The quadratic equation implied by (13B1) is as follows:
e2v2 + e1v + e0 = 0;
where
e2 = pt; ¡e1 = tw + t(p + ¹±)w + p(w + "); e0 = (p + ¹±)(w + ")w:
Similar formulas can be obtained for (13B2).
Returning to the general (13B), note that Z0
v(w;p;0;0) = +1, but as a matter of
fact, v ¸ wm implies Z0









This inequality determines another domain of the admissible parameter values than its
S counterpart.
To determine if S or B is valid, one must check inequality dB > ±cB (Z0
s < 0).
At this point we specify our earlier results on the means-tested pension, where the
utility function is Cobb{Douglas and the underlying bene¯t is proportional: ® = 0. We
con¯ne our attention to the simplest case, where there are only two types with earnings
wL and wH, wL < 1 < wH. Let the value of the means-tested bene¯t lie between the two
proportional bene¯ts: ¹¡1¿v
(P)
L < ° < ¹¡1¿v
(P)
H . Then type L receives a means-tested
bene¯t, while type H does not. In the slack case, the two lifetime budget constraints
are respectively
cL + ±¹cL +
tpwLcL
pcL + twL
= wL + ¹° + " (12SML)
11and
cH + ±¹cH +
tpwHcH
pcH + (t ¡ ¹¯)wH
= wH + ": (12SMH)
In the binding case, however, (13B1) refers to H and (13B2) refers to L. Note that in the
optimality condition (13B2), ¯ becomes 0, but in the pension balance equation (7M)
¿(fLvL + fHvH) = ¹(fL° + fH¯vH);
it remains positive.
We have a typical problem of general equilibrium. There are three equations: (7M),
(12SML), (12SMH), and three unknowns: vL, vH, ¯.
We have determined the conditional individual decisions and the relevant variables.
The resulting formulas, however, are so complex that the analytical treatment of the
balance equation and socially optimal rates and others seems hopeless.
It can easily be shown that under mild conditions, in the proportional pension- and
tax system (" = ® = 0) the report is positive and less than the earning: wm · vi < wi,
i = 1;2;:::;I. The other variables are also meaningful. We only conjecture but cannot
prove that for socially optimal rates, the higher the preference to report, the tighter the
credit constraint is.
White economy
Before giving up analytical hopes, it is worthwhile considering the white economy, where
every worker reports his full wage: p = +1, i.e. v = w. (Note that we have dropped
the indices of type.) Now (12S) simpli¯es to the linear equation c+±¹c = ¹®(1¡w)+
" + w(1 ¡ µ), i.e. to
cS =
¹®(1 ¡ w) + " + w(1 ¡ µ)
1 + ±¹
and dS = ±cS: (14S)
Similarly, (5B) reduces to




In both cases, ¹ v = ¹ w = 1 makes the two balance equations rather trivial: ¹(® + ¯) = ¿
and ¹ a = (µ ¡ ")=(1 + ¹). It is quite easy to show that the credit constraint is only
binding if and only if
®(1 ¡ w) > ±[(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ)w + "] ¡ ¹¡1w:
We can immediately check that in case of positive °at bene¯t (® > 0) only earners
below average (w < 1) can have slack credit constraints, but only if ® and ¿ are large
enough.
Note that due to the assumed perfect substitution between private and public sav-
ings, the slack system's optimal variables are independent of the contribution rate ¿.
This suggests that in investigating socially optimal rates, it is su±cient to consider the
binding system.
12For the time being, we consider proportional transfer systems. Under this assump-
tion, we are able to obtain analytical results for socially optimal contribution and tax
rates. To avoid lengthy notations, we only consider the case when every worker has a
unit wage: w = 1 and a binding credit constraint. Now the social welfare function is
reduced to
g(¿;µ) = log(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ) + ¹log(¹¡1¿) + ·¤ logµ; where ·¤ = (1 + ¹)·:
Taking the partial derivatives with respect to the two rates and setting them to zero,
yields the optimality conditions:
¡¿ + ¹(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ) = 0 and ¡ µ + ·¤(1 ¡ ¿ ¡ µ) = 0:
Solving for the optimal rates:
¿o =
1
1 + ¹¡1(1 + ·¤)
and µo =
¹¡1·¤
1 + ¹¡1(1 + ·¤)
:
What happens if we relax the proportionality assumption and give way to ® > 0 or
" > 0? We obtain a surprising result, at least for the two-type model, where wL and






For the time being, let us neglect public services: (· = 0) and take into account
the relation ¯ = ¹¡1¿ in the formulas cH = cL, cL = dL and cH = dH. The resulting
equations are
¿ + µ = 1 and wH = (wH + ¹¡1)¿ + (wH ¡ 1)µ;
that yield the optimal contribution and tax rates:
¿o =
1
1 + ¹¡1 and µo =
¹¡1
1 + ¹¡1:
Taking also into account the public services (· > 0), these rates should be reduced
to make room for the net tax rate ! = µ ¡ ". Then co = do = (1 ¡ !)=(1 + ¹) and
ao = !=(1 + ¹). Now the social welfare function coincides with the utility function.
Leaving aside the logged variables's denominator 1 + ¹ and their common multiplier
1 + ¹, we end up with the formula g(!) = log(1 ¡ !) + ·log!.
Taking the derivative of g(!) and expressing the optimal net rate from g0(!) = 0,






1 + ¹¡1 =
1
(1 + ·)(1 + ¹¡1)
and µo = ¹¡1¿o:
13Black economy
Another analytically tractable case is the black economy, where workers only report the
minimum earnings. For the government it is super°uous to struggle with the pension








In this case, the socially optimal tax rate can be derived analytically again. Due to
the logarithmic utility functions, the constant denominators as well as the common




fi log(wi ¡ wmµ) + ·log(wmµ):












Taking the common denominators, an I-degree polynomial obtains. As an illustration,











Of course, reality is neither white nor black but grey. It would be pleasant to have
simple solutions for the grey economy as well, but this is a futile hope. It is time to
turn on the computer.
4. Numerical illustrations
We continue our investigation by numerical illustrations. We assume that the time
spent in retirement is 1=2 of that spent in work: ¹ = 0:5. The subjective discount
factor is ± = 0:5. First we neglect redistribution and consider the white economy. After
some experimentation, we have chosen · = 1=3 for the utility coe±cient of the public
services, yielding ·¤ = (3=2) £ (1=3) = 1=2. This choice renders the results for the
white economy reasonable: the socially optimal tax and contribution rates: µo = 0:25
and ¿o = 0:25 and the corresponding consumption pair is c = 1=2 and d = 1=2 with
a = 1=6.
Switching on redistribution, the optimal contribution and tax rates become ¿o = 1=4,
µo = 3=4 respectively, and the parameters of redistribution ®o = 1=2 = "o. All these
point to the obviously unrealistic assumption of the white economy, namely the lack of
labor supply elasticity.
14Turning to the black economy, for · = 1=3 and wm = 0:4, µo = (1=3)=((1 + 1=3) £
0:4) = 1=(4 £ 0:4) = 0:625 is an extremely high value. Probably in the black economy,
· should be radically reduced, decreasing the optimal tax rate as well.
Next we move to the grey economy with various shades, represented by p, but for
the time being, retain the previous rates. To begin with, we are studying the impact
of preference to report parameter p on individual behavior in a proportional tax- and
pension system with " = ® = 0.
15Table 1. Preferences to report with proportional taxes and bene¯ts: w = 1
Prefer-
ence Reported Worker Pensioner
to report earning Bene¯t Saving consumption Tax
p v(P) b(P) s(P) c(P) d(P) a(P)
0.25 0.417 0.209 0.075 0.717 0.358 0.070
0.50 0.578 0.289 0.027 0.684 0.342 0.096
0.75 0.667 0.333 0 0.667 0.333 0.111
1.00 0.705 0.353 0 0.647 0.353 0.118
1.50 0.759 0.379 0 0.621 0.379 0.126
2.00 0.795 0.398 0 0.602 0.398 0.133
3.00 0.841 0.421 0 0.579 0.421 0.140
4.00 0.870 0.435 0 0.565 0.435 0.145
5.00 0.890 0.445 0 0.555 0.445 0.148
+1 1.000 0.500 0 0.500 0.500 0.167
Table 1 illustrates the fact that as the value of the preference to report rises, the
reported earning rises, the worker consumption decreases. The behavior of pensioner
consumption is more complex: it decreases in a slack system (for weaker preferences
to report) but increases in a binding system (for stronger preferences to report). To
display the white economy, we present c and d for p = +1, in the last row of Table
1. The separating preference to report is just p¤ = 0:75, where s becomes 0, italicized.
Presumably, in the former case, the gain in pensions does not make up for the loss in
savings.
In Table 1, we assumed identical earnings. In the further calculations, we shall
arbitrarily apply a very simple earning distribution: (wL;wH) with fH = 1=3 and
fL = 2=3. To enhance its impact, we have chosen a rather extreme distribution with
wL = 0:5 and wH = 2, yielding a unitary average wage.
Considering heterogeneous earnings, we start our investigation with proportional
systems: ® = 0 and " = 0. To illustrate the indeterminacy of the social optimum, we
¯x µ = 0:28 and let ¿ change.
For the sake of brevity, we single out two parameter values of the preference to report:
p = 0:5 for dark grey, p = 2 for light grey economy. Table 2 displays the result for the
dark grey economy. As the contribution rate rises above a critical value 0.3, traditional
savings disappear and aggregate life-cycle saving starts increasing. Therefore reported
earnings start diminishing, and social welfare also drops. The highest socially optimal
contribution rate and the corresponding variables are italicized.
16Table 2. Impact of contribution rate, dark grey economy, p = 0:5
Contribution Reported Aggregate Social
rate earning saving Tax welfare
¿o ¹ v S ¹ a V
0.28 0.547 0.016 0.102 {3.108
0.30 0.547 0.005 0.102 {3.108
0.32 0.540 0 0.101 {3.110
0.34 0.528 0 0.098 {3.113
Table 3. Impact of contribution rate, light grey economy, p = 2
Contribution Reported Aggregate Social
rate earning saving Tax welfare
¿o ¹ v S ¹ a V
0.16 0.815 0.024 0.152 {4.859
0.18 0.815 0.008 0.152 {4.859
0.20 0.808 0 0.151 {4.852
0.22 0.795 0 0.148 {4.843
0.24 0.782 0 0.146 {4.838
0.26 0.770 0. 0.144 {4.837
0.28 0.757 0 0.141 {4.838
0.30 0.745 0 0.139 {4.842
0.32 0.733 0 0.137 {4.849
The situation is di®erent in the light grey economy, shown in Table 3. For a given
contribution rate, workers report higher earnings, therefore they need less traditional
savings than in the dark grey economy. The critical contribution rate drops to 0.18,
and passing it, the optimal contribution rate in the light grey economy is about 0.26,
italicized, where a marginal rise in the contribution rate balances the marginal utility
of higher old-age consumption and that of lower reported earnings and lower public
services.
Having studied the proportional transfer systems, we turn to their generalizations,
inserting °at bene¯ts with varying size. We con¯ne now our attention to the lowest
optimal contribution and tax rates.
17Table 4. An optimal system with a given °at bene¯t, dark grey economy, p = 0:5
Contri- Marginal
Flat bution Tax replace- Reported Social
bene¯t rate rate ment rate earning Tax welfare
® ¿o µo ¯o ¹ v(P) ¹ a V
0.00 0.22 0.28 0.440 0.547 0.102 {3.108
0.04 0.35 0.29 0.620 0.500 0.097 {3.113
0.08 0.37 0.29 0.568 0.466 0.090 {3.124
0.12 0.36 0.29 0.447 0.439 0.085 {3.140
0.16 0.36 0.29 0.331 0.411 0.079 {3.161
0.20 0.35 0.29 0.181 0.385 0.074 {3.185
Table 4 suggests the following regularity: the higher the °at component, the lower is
the average reported earnings and consequently, the lower is the social welfare, assuming
that the government chose optimal tax rates. There is not much sense in di®erences
between the values of social welfare functions, rather we must measure the decline by
consumption equivalencies. For example, let e > 1 be such a scalar that by multiplying
the earnings of both types' earnings with it, the social welfare with a °at component
® = 0:2 becomes identical with that of the original proportional system. We obtain
e = 1:03, i.e. the economy should have earnings uniformly higher by 3% to achieve the
original welfare of the proportional system in the foregoing °at system.
Note that contrary to our model, in reality, by increasing the value of the °at com-
ponent, the contribution rate declines rather than rises0.
The situation is more complex in the light grey economy. The social welfare is
maximal at a °at component ® = 0:32 (italicized row). Now it is the earnings in the
proportional pension system which should be raised uniformly by 2.1%.
Table 5. An optimal system with a given °at bene¯t, light grey economy, p = 2
Contri- Marginal
Flat bution Tax replace- Reported Social
bene¯t rate rate ment rate earning Tax welfare
® ¿o µo ¯o ¹ v(F) ¹ a(F) V (F)
0.00 0.26 0.26 0.520 0.782 0.136 {4.835
0.20 0.22 0.27 0.172 0.746 0.134 {4.779
0.24 0.21 0.27 0.094 0.735 0.132 {4.772
0.28 0.20 0.27 0.013 0.724 0.130 {4.767
0.32 0.22 0.28 0 0.707 0.132 {4.755
0.36 0.25 0.26 0 0.703 0.122 {4.760
0.40 0.28 0.24 0 0.699 0.112 {4.773
18Table 6 provides the details of the four optimal solutions, namely those of the pro-
portional and the °at systems in the dark and grey economies, respectively. The last
(¯fth) block contains the data of the means-tested system, to be outlined below. For
comparability, the lifetime utility is broken down to four terms: utility of 1) worker
consumption, 2) pensioner consumption, 3) public services and 4) reporting earnings.
Table 6. Comparison of optimal systems with heterogeneous earnings
Reported Worker Pensioner L i f e t i m e U t i l i t y
Earning earning consumption Saving 1 2 3 4
w v c d s U1 U2 U3 U4
dark grey proportional pension: p = 0:5, ® = 0
0.5 0.274 0.339 0.169 0.024 {1.083 {0.888 {1.140 {0.922
2.0 1.095 1.355 0.677 0.098 0.304 {0.195 {1.140 {0.228
dark grey pension with a °at component: p = 0:5, ® = 0:2
0.5 0.198 0.373 0.236 0.000 {0.986 {0.722 {1.299 {1.008
2.0 0.760 1.346 0.673 0.168 0.297 {0.198 {1.299 {0.327
light grey proportional pension: p = 2:0, ® = 0
0.5 0.391 0.297 0.203 0.000 {1.215 {0.796 {0.999 {3.442
2.0 1.564 1.187 0.813 0.000 0.171 {0.103 {0.999 {0.669
light grey pension with a °at component: p = 2:0, ® = 0:32
0.5 0.360 0.320 0.320 0.000 {1.139 {0.570 {1.013 {3.484
2.0 1.400 1.168 0.584 0.132 0.155 {0.269 {1.013 {0.727
light grey means-tested pension: p = 2:0, ° = 0:32
0.5 0.360 0.320 0.320 0.000 {1.139 {0.570 {0.991 {3.484
2.0 1.497 1.141 0.571 0.110 0.132 {0.281 {0.991 {0.690
Let us start with the dark grey economy. It is obvious that in an optimal proportional
system almost every variable is proportional to earnings. The low-paid's pension as
well as the corresponding pensioner consumption is inadmissibly low: d
(P)
L = 0:169. By
introducing a °at bene¯t, this problem is ameliorated, but the report of earnings goes
down so much that the level of public services drops and the utility of underreporting
also shrinks. Nevertheless, the comparison needs detailed calculations.
Turning to the light grey economy, the average tax is much higher with °at bene¯ts
than without them. Though the pensioner's consumption is higher than it was in the
dark grey economy, it is still insu±cient: d
(P)
L = 0:203. For a °at component ® = 0:32,
that value jumps to d
(F)
L = 0:32, quite satisfactory. At the same time, the average
tax remains acceptable, while the quantity of public services and the utility level of
underreporting are tolerable.
At programming the means-tested system, we have encountered di±culties, therefore
we only compare our means-tested system with the optimal °at system, reserving the
latter's parameter values. Since we have not yet reported aggregate data, we give them
19here: V (M) = ¡4:731, is only better than its °at counterpart within the margin of
calculation error. The average reported earnings is also greater than in the optimal °at
system: ¹ v = 0:739 > 0:707. Using the equivalence scale, one must raise the earnings
by 0.6% in the optimal °at system. We have not yet succeeded to ¯nd the optimal
means-tested system!
5. Conclusions
We have constructed a model, in which|re°ecting mainly the characteristics of tran-
sitional and developing countries|the tax- and pension system in°uences the reported
earnings rather than the labor supply. We have made just the ¯rst theoretical and
numerical computations. The results are promising but a lot of further analytical inves-
tigations and numerical trials are needed to corroborate the temporary conclusions: the
introduction of a signi¯cant °at component crowds out the public services, especially
in economies with low reporting preference like Hungary is. But even in lighter grey
economies the proportional system may remain superior to the progressive one if an
appropriate means-tested (or a pension credit) system complements it. The impact of
progressive earning tax requires further analysis (only appearing in the white economy
in our paper) like that of the interaction of agents with di®erent preferences to report0
(Simonovits, 2008).
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